Another brillant work of Scholorship by Kolko. His material on N. Vietnam motivation is particulary interesting

In "Anatomy of a War" author Gabriel Kolko has done an impeccable job of revealing the truth behind America's involvement in Indochina. Kolko lucidly illustrates how by 1948 the US has recognized that the Viet Minh, the anti-French resistance led by Ho Chi Minh, was not only the national movement of Vietnam, but that the Viet Minh favored independent development and ignored the interests of foreign investors and was therefor deemed "the enemy" by US policy planners.

Kolko adroitly elucidates how the US blocked all attempts at political settlement of the conflict, installed a Latin American-style terror state in South Vietnam, and blocked free, democratic elections in Vietnam because it was obvious the Viet Minh was going to win. "Anatomy of a War" illustrates how American war planners escalated the attack against South Vietnam from massive state terror to outright aggression and expanded the war to all of Indochina. A compelling and chilling account of one America's more depraved acts this century.

Kolko writes from the point of view of the Vietnamese, the real victims and the real heroes of the Indochina anticolonial wars. This is a perspective unavailable in any other volume. It is an excellent antidote for the rampant revisionism now afoot regarding this disgraceful episode in our history.

This author shows lack of knowledge about the North Vietnamese and Vc troops who fought at Hue. This lack of knowledge means that the readers have no clue of why the battle Hue lasted for several weeks.

According to two recently publish Communist books: "Hue, Spring 1968, Ban Nghien Cuu Dang[the Communist Party Research committee], Hue, 1988" and the "Tck-tkn [General offensive-General Uprising 1968, Ban Nghien Cuu Dang[the Communist Party Research committee], Ho Chi Minh City, 1988". The Nva/Vc troops in Hue consist of 4 full strength regiments: the E1, E5, E8, E9 and several battalions from the E6 regiment several sapper battalions (E is the NVA denote for regiment). Only the South Viets Hac Bao Company, most of who during the New Year was on leave, defended Hue. The Nva attacked on the first day of the Lunar New Year and quickly gain control of the city. After which they release 2,300 violent criminals from the city prison and armed them and the city VC sympathizers to form the "Nghia Quan"[Rightous Army]. In total the Nva/VC have around 9,000 to 10,000 troops in the city including the "Nghia Quan' criminals. On the second day of the New Year, the ARVN 1st Airborne Brigade consists of the 2nd and 6th battalions fought their way into Hue by way of An Hoa. They succeeded in getting into the city and later the ARVN 9th Airborne battalions; fresh from their victory at Quang tri also joined them. It's true that the S. Viets ask the Americans for help after the second week of battle but it was not due to S. Viets troops cowardice, it was due to lack of men power(which the author did not clarify).

The ARVN who fought at Hue consists of the Airborne, then later the Marines, Rangers and the 1st Division, the best fighting force in Vietnam war. However, initially, the S. Viets leaders do not want the ncient city of Hue to be destroyed and forces the S. Viets and Americans to fight with little or no air and artillery support. This means the cost in retaking the city from 8,000 well-fortified enemies has to be done hand to hand. During the week of the battle, the S. Vietnamese 2nd and 7th battalions went from 500 men each down to only 200 men. The S. Viets 9th airborne battalion went from 400 men to only 100 men, the rest were killed and wounded. The S. Viets marines and ranger battalions that later came to join in the fight was fresh from the battles in Saigon without replacement and were all at or around half strengths. A typical S. Viet airborne battalion consists of 500 men, 800 men for the Vietnamese marine battalion and 450 men for the Vietnamese ranger battalion. The Nva/VC also lost a tremendous number of men and o both sides settle down to defensive and probing attacks. This also is true for the USMC since the US marines for the first two weeks or so, fought only during the day and then retreat to the MACV compound at night, this go on until sufficient troops and allies replacement have arrive. The battle for Hue was bloody and vicious, the S. Viet dead was twice that of the U.S marines, as for the Nva/VC most of their troops die during the battle for the city.

An excellent book. Perhaps the only improvement would be the addition of more detailed maps so that the reader is able to follow the events as they arise. As a Marine veteran, I seldom read anything concerning the Vietnam war because most of the books are not very factual. However, this book is well written and reveals a great deal of research. There is NO fiction here. Nolan once again demonstrates his outstanding literary talents. I agree, I dont understand how Hollywood has let this slip away.

The latest read I've experienced from Keith Nolan, Tet 1968 gave me an understanding I never got from text books or movies. I felt that I was there, and understood how the grunts felt. I have read most of Nolan's other works and find this to be a deserving addition. My next is Into Laos/Lam Son 719, which I was finally able to track down after four years. I expect more of the same realism, unwavering accuracy, and action filled narrative that I did in Tet 1968.

John Prados, a veteran writer of military history, has attempted to write the first detailed scholarly examination of the role of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the Vietnam War. The Trail, dubbed the "Blood Road," was a vital pathway through the jungles of Laos and Cambodia that enabled the North Vietnamese regime to conduct a protracted guerrilla struggle in South Vietnam. Without the Trail, the indigenous Viet Cong in South Vietnam would have been virtually on their own. Nor is Prados content just to examine the history of the Trail; rather, he poses the critical question: could the United States have severed the Trail and thereby achieved a military victory in Vietnam?

There is no doubt that The Blood Trail has historical value. Prados has pulled together high and low-level accounts from both sides to produce the first real synthesis on this subject. Unfortunately, far more is promised than is delivered by this book. One major problem is the over-focus on Washington strategy sessions by Bundy, McNamara, LBJ, et al. It seems that every book written on the Vietnam War has to detour into the Oval Office, no matter how much this ground has been trampled before. The only germane aspect of these familiar policy debates is the issue of whether the insurgency in Vietnam would be handled with diplomatic or military means. Prados shows that severing the Trail by a variety of military means was the preferred option.

Although the Americans tried everything from ground attacks, bombing, mining and raiding, they could not sever the Trail. Thus Prados concludes that, "the truth is that the war fighters lost their gambit". Well, that's rather obvious Dr. Prados, given that we lost the war. Unfortunately, by asserting that we couldn't sever the Trail by military means (which actually is not proven, only that the means employed did not work), the author leaves the reader high and dry. What then should the United States have done about the Trail? Abandon South Vietnam in 1964? Negotiate surrender? How could we have known that interdicting the Trail would fail if we did not try it? There is nothing worthy of being called a conclusion here. I also believe that Dr. Prados overstates the effect of severing the Trail in any case. Even if the US military had successfully interdicted the Trail for say 6-12 months, thereby disrupting the enemy build-up, Hanoi would merely have asked for a temporary cease-fire. They could then use the period of cease-fire to repair any damage to the Trail.

I think Prados misses the boat on this one. The Vietnam War was not an exercise in military logistics, whereby if we had severed the enemy lines of communication their war effort would have collapsed. Prados has been influenced too heavily by Jomini and Clausewitz, instead of Mao. First, the enemy would always find a way to get some troops and supplies into South Vietnam, no matter how painful we made this to them. Even if we stopped 80-90% of the troops and supplies - a real success - the remaining 10-20% would probably be enough to keep a low-level insurgency burning in South Vietnam. The war was not about logistics, it was about motivation and protracted struggle. The fact is that as long as Hanoi's leaders remained committed to victory, they could outlast any temporary US military successes. The United States never intended to adopt a large-scale, open-ended defense of South Vietnam for decades on end. Thus, the Trail was probably not as critical to victory or defeat as Prados makes out.

As a participant in the air activity over the trail in 67&68,I was hopeing for more information regarding the ground activites during this period. In actuallity, there is little information about either. Onr glareing error is the authors continuing referance to all FAC aircraft as Ravens. The Ravens came into being in 1967 and were working days, flying from within Laos itself. In most cases when the author is calling the FACs Ravens, they were actually Nail or Covey FACs, flying from Thailand. Still waiting for a book that covers the construction crews, maintainers, truck drivers and GUNNERS that were a brave and awesome group.

This is a must-read for all Vietnam veterans and students of the Vietnam War. Author Prados outlines why we were never able to interdict the flow of troops and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos into South Vietnam. As a veteran of C-130 flare missions searching for trucks over the Trail, I now understand why our task was often so fruitless.

Sam McGowan
Vietnam Veteran, author of "The Cave", a novel of the Vietnam War.

Morley Safer traveled back to Vietnam in 1989 to see how that country has changed in the fourteen years since the end of America's involvement in the war. Did the Vietnamese people really win? Morley's goverment provided guide, Ms. Mai, is assigned to escort and provide him access to the sites he reported from during the war. Ms. Mai envies the freedom that women in America have. All throughout the country it is apparent that the Vietnamese people still live with the scars of the war. It is an inescapable reality of their existence. Now, under communism, the Vietnamese people are worse off ... and it is made very clear in this book. Morley writes that the one thing many Vietnamese citizens resent the most is that they do not have the ability to hop on a Freedom Bird to escape the harsh realities of their daily existence. This book provides a fair perspective on what the Vietnamese people think of their victory.

This is one of those books someone gives you for Christmas because you are a Vietnam veteran, and you digest it to see what it has in common with your experiences. While I was a helicopter pilot in the Delta, and nowhere near the places Morley visits in his periodic reporting forays, one gets the message of what anyone who frequented this tropical country eventually got. "The place sort of grows on you," one journalist comments to another. That's what happened to all of us; we experienced the other side of the world as young men. This was an out-of-the-culture experience that only we knew we were certainly having--despite the efforts of our media, politicians, and college protesters to define it. Another book the Vietnam vet needs on his bookshelf to help sort out the morass this bureacratic farce was paid for in our military blood.

This is a book which has affected me greatly both as a person who grew up in the Vietnam area and as a professional journalist. Safer succeeds in creating pictures of Vietnam which were never before filed. It is a crime that this book is not in print.

this book is very good for me to build my strength
and power for fight against military dictatorship
in my country. Thank you for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

KoKoOo

This book was for me an opener into the evolution of Burma's political scene, and it proved to be a good one.

Whilst it takes some time to get accustomed to the many abbreviations of Burma's political parties and factions, once it is gotten used to, Freedom from Fear becomes an essential book for those interested in the becoming of Aung San Suu Kyi - daughter of Burma's national hero, the late Aung San - and her process of fighting and eventually winning the support of the country she always called home depite her international influences.

Though Freedom from Fear would be a good book to start learning about Burma's modern political history, I would suggest first reading about pre-colonial Burma to get a better grasp and understanding of the country's stand and place in Southeast Asia.

This book really inspired me. And all the details information written in this book are 100% accurate and I was so suprised to read all those history things that I have learnt in my childhood in my country, Myanmar. I believe this is one of the books that every patriots of Burma should have.

COL Michael D. Mahler served as the personnel officer (S-1) of the 1st Brigade/1st Infantry Division from August-December 1967 and Executive Officer of 3-5th Cavalry/9th Infantry Division from December 1967 to August 1968. The weirdest thing about this memoir is that Mahler never identifies his own unit or any other, or any individuals; everything and everyone is referred to in generic terms. It is very odd to read an account where no names are mentioned. With all this secrecy, I'm surprised that Mahler didn't conceal that this was a Vietnam memoir and instead call it "Orangeland". Essentially, this is a collection of anecdotes, war stories and observations strung together. Some are interesting, some are not. This work is lacking in humanity, since there are no characters (just generic, faceless, company commanders, platoon leaders, etc.) and there are no great lessons here. It is also odd for a non-green tabber (i.e. a unit commander) to be writing a memoir; the actual trigger-pullers might have done a better job. There is not even any of the drama of supporting a combat unit; Mahler could have gotten much more into the specifics of armor logistics but instead he just glosses over it. Overly generalized to a fault. One suspects Mahler is some kind of weenie by the end. Of note, the squadron intelligence officer (S-2) is never mentioned, so I guess intelligence and what the enemy was up to was not a big concern for Mahler. The maps are few and crude. The only slight value of this book is the paucity of other armored unit memoirs from Vietnam. This book is far inferior to Sergeant Ralph Zumbro's Tank Sergeant.

The previous reviewer missed the point. As an Executive Officer Mike Mahler was second in command, and often on-site commander of the unit. In this position he also had a lot of day-to-day contact with supporting and supported units. This is not a blood and guts account of fighting tanks, but one of how Armored Cavalry works. As a former Armored Cav Officer it was a great read and Colonel Mahler did a great job of explaining the complexities and challenge of Cavalry Operations. I wish I had had officers as good as he was commanding me.

As to not ID'ing the unit, that is his choice and I will not fault him for it. Maybe he just did not want to drag up the names of dead or incompetent officers. Who knows.

If I could I would love to talk with the Colonel one on one about his experiences. Great book for anyone interested in Armored Cavalry.

Major Mahler served in an Armored cavalry unit in Vietnam before and during the Tet Offensive, and here he relates his experiences during that time.

One may not associate armor with Vietnam, but armor did play a significant role in the war, as Major Mahler demonstrates here.

The stories within run the gamut, from the Birddog pilot shot down to the discovery of VC grains hidden along a road that the troopers confiscate, only to find that a nearby village gets pillaged by the VC because the grain was hidden along the road for the VC to take; the troopers gather enough grain to give back to the stricken villagers. There is also the tunnel that an APC falls into - and promptly unearths a surprised NVA general. There are the running shootouts during the Tet Offensive, and children accidently hit by .50 caliber machine gun fire and operated on by Army medics. There is the night an enemy company literally walks into an ambush by armor and a delightfully one-sided battle with an NVA batallion holed up in a large village, a battle that somewhat resembles the climax of Invasion USA.

There is also Major Mahler's note on the situation on the ground following Tet - of how farmers who could not use roads the year before could now take their crops to market, "and this was progress that could be seen and felt in a war where progress could not easily be quantified."

Major Mahler takes us to Vietnam through his words and we see what went on.

This book, thanks to the very accurate drawings and precise indications (length, diameter, type of wood and fletching, colours indications) have enabled me to duplicate native American arrows with precision. I have often counterchecked the descriptions with some information I have found in museums and found the book very reliable. First pity, there aren't enough photos or colour drawings. Second and most catastrophic pity: why has the publisher apparently given up the idea of publishing the second volume about the Great plains, Columbia and Southwest?

It is true that this book is not a how-to book, but I think that was the author's intention. What it is, is a much-needed reference work, indeed, it is the first and certainly most up-to-date record of American Indian archery equipment. It's been at least 50 years since a book of this sort has been published. My only objection is that the book does not (cannot?) provide enough context or provenance; this is a minor objection. Perhaps fans of Hamm would be more satisfied with Bows and Arrows of the Native Americans. I'd say the book is directed more towards the ethnographer or anthropologist; however, the book is clearly an invaluable reference for the traditional archer/bowyer (hey, this is a "living" hobby - be creative), as it provides dimensions, materials used, colors, and closeups of designs. Fans of American Indian art in gerneral will also appreciate it. Volume II, which should be available before the end of the year, should be at least as good.

I read the two previous reviews, so before buying I exactly knew what to expect.
I received my book a couple of days ago, I really liked it, at least for what it is, a kind of catalog of bows, perfectly drawn, with explanation of wood used, dimensions, and colours.
This on Tribe by Tribe basis.
I'll wait volume 2, about western and Plains Indians.
So, if you are really intrested in Native American bows, this is a book to buy, if you prefer something like a "how to", than the traditional Bowyer's bibles are more fit to what you want. Alberto

The three stars are awarded for the detailed content of the book- it's only good point. The style is very academic, lacking life and fails to captivate. Despite the book being named after him, Pol Pot is hardly mentioned in it's 465 pages. Furthermore the book isn't self contained- if you want to know how Pol Pot came to power, you'll have to read another of Kiernans books. Here he paints an incomplete picture, merely informing us of US governments prominent role (surprise, surprise..), whereby Nixon had 150,000 civilians killed in illegal bombings, which were capitalised on by the Khmer Rouge to get mass support. The book also basically ignores what happened after Pol Pots fall, thus leaving it seemingly incomplete. Also, you'll need to know about the Vietnam war and Mao's China, as Kiernan doesn't bother to briefly explain either, despite them being pivotal in this context.

What the book does excel at is it's main focus- the role of racism in Pol Pots exceedingly bizarre, deranged and horrific strain of communism, which consisted of an intense xenophobia, especially focused against other communist countries. Still, this doesn't make up for the stale writing style. Overall, this book is not for the casual reader, and is more suited to those who know a fair amount about Cambodia in this era.

A follow-on to the author's "How Pol Pot Came to Power". Provides numerous leads for any student of Cambodia to pursue in field research on the history of Modern Cambodia. Ben Kiernan reaches many sources not easily accessed by others.

A brilliant indictment of Pol Pot and a highly readable account of the Killing Fields. The focus on ethnic cleansing provides a new way of understanding the horrors of the Khmer Rouge.

Poor plot. Author should have written some short stories for periodicals before writing a book.

Authors should stop jacking up rating of stars by writing reviews themselves....

Please stop this practice

This book has the seeds of something exceptional to come in the future. But bring a history of Pakistan before you read it. The stories are beautifully told, the black humor sounds like an American influence. It all weaves back and forth, needs some serious organizing. The author feels very strongly about his family and his country, and I appreciate that. And I hope to hear from him again before long.

I am a personal friend of the author, and enjoyed her book very much. She is a medical doctor, and would never engineer good reviews as the next reviewer you will read suggests. To accuse without proof is folly. As far as I am concerned, Dr. Khan is a great story-teller and talented writer, whose point of view may not always agree with everyones, but is enlighteningly humorous. Her view of Pakistan lacks prejudice and I have many reports that it is an accurate picture of life in that country. Dr. Philip Petersen

This book was published before Robert S. McNamara started churning out books about Nam. There had been a lot of books about Nam up to that point, and what struck me was how much had been left out of all of them. Since this book called itself the complete story, and listed the author's home town and zip code, I wrote to the author, asking if he could send me any funny Nam bits for MY VIETNAM WAR JOKE BOOK. It was difficult for me to believe that Wilbur Morrison was smart enough to know how much of his book I hadn't read and still write to tell me that Nam had no humor, the American forces in Vietnam entirely lacked anything to joke about, and I should do more reading. Thinking `What does he know?' I then wrote to Robert S. McNamara, promising to give him full credit for any funny Nam bits he could send me, though MY VIETNAM WAR JOKE BOOK wasn't really that kind of joke book, it was more about things that a 19-year-old grunt might say that would never find its way between the covers of any book more historical than DISPATCHES by Michael Herr. I even remembered a joke that I hadn't heard in Nam: What do you call a guy with no arms and no legs when he's swimming? Bob, of course, though you might not call him Bob to his face if he were the Secretary of Defense of the United States of America. Did Bob even know what Nixon was saying when the White House Transcripts book said, "That was national security, because it had to do with the (expletive deleted) Vietnam war" ? (President to John Dean, March, 1973, when a cancer on the presidency was all the rage).

There is a point in THE ELEPHANT AND THE TIGER when I definitely thought that something was left out, possibly because those who supplied the official information thought it was necessary to sanitize it. In November, 1946, something happened in Haiphong which does not get mentioned, but by December, Morrison reports that the Viet Minh were retaliating for something by engaging in open warfare against French troops. If this book was really complete, every reader would be informed what the Vietnamese thought they were retaliating against, and would not be surprised, not even as surprised as some Americans were by the ceasefire Tet offensive in 1968, which was designed to show that if anyone in Nam didn't know what was going to happen, it was sure to be the Americans. That might not be funny in America, but by 1968, I'll bet the French were able to laugh, and they might still be laughing.

This ahrd-reading book is really THE FULL STORY OF THE VIETNAM WAR. IT's detailed and very well researched. The author had access to a lot pf previously unseen documents, due to the Freedom Of Information Act.

But a detail amazed terrifically. In page 114, Morrison makes the following statement, about JFK murder:

"Later that day, during a motorcade through the streets of Dallas, President Kennedy was assassinated by a professed communist and former United States Marine - Lee Harvey Oswald"

I almost choked with desbilief. Does Morrison, such an accomplished and veteran writer, really believes in that? Does he really believe in the Warren COmission report that Oswald acted alone??!! I could not believe this. At least he could have written "...was SUPPOSEDLY assassinated by..."

Oh boy, this is heavy reading. The book deals about everything in the Vitnam War. The funny thing is that Morrison is consiedered to be a great military AVIATION writer, but this book delaing with a much more complex subject is very entertaining, objective and complete.

Great read, albeit a hard one.